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Ballot Measures 
Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Direct democracy has a tremendous impact on the policy-
making process in almost every state. Twenty-four states have 
adopted statewide ballot initiatives, a political institution that 
allows citizens to propose and approve laws directly. Eighteen 
of these states also allow citizens to submit constitutional 
amendments for voters to consider by initiative. Twenty-three 
states have enacted a popular referendum process—that is, the 
ability of voters to force a statewide vote on laws the legislature 
passes. Forty-nine states require voters to approve any legisla-
tively proposed constitutional amendment via a referendum 
(Delaware is the exception). Almost all Americans, then, are 
governed in a hybrid-style republic,1
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 defined as a democratic 
system that mixes elements of both representative and direct 
democracy. 
 1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors 
and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 
296–99 (2005) (discussing some of the pros and cons of a hybrid-style republic). 
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Despite widespread popular support for the institutions of 
direct democracy,2 asking voters to consider policies via the ini-
tiative and referendum increases both the time and cognitive 
cost associated with making democratic decisions. Countless 
surveys have documented that citizens struggle to understand 
basic facts about representative democracy.3 This finding has 
caused many to worry that the increased costs that direct de-
mocracy places on voters is simply asking too much. Making 
matters worse, research on direct democracy confirms that vot-
ers know even less about the measures they consider than they 
do about the candidates they choose.4 Further, voters often re-
port finding ballot measures confusing,5 and this confusion is at 
least partly responsible for increased ballot roll off6
 
 2. For some research on public opinion toward the institutions of direct 
democracy, see Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Enraged or 
Engaged?: Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies, 
60 POL. RES. Q. 351 (2007); Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Popular Support 
for Direct Democracy, 12 PARTY POL. 671 (2006). 
—that is, 
when an individual does not register a vote for a candidate or 
issue on the ballot—on initiatives and referendums and voters 
 3. For a study that examines how information affects voters in presiden-
tial elections, see Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in 
Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996). For a discussion of how 
poorly constructed most individuals’ perception of the political world is, see 
Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLO-
GY AND DISCONTENT 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964). For a summary of what 
individuals know about politics, see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT 
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
(1996). 
 4. A few studies that have examined what people know about the 
measures they vote on include DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOT-
ING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); Craig M. Bur-
nett, Does Campaign Spending Help Voters Learn About Ballot Measures?, 32 
ELECTORAL STUD. 78 (2013); Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The Populist 
Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government, in 
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 
33 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclo-
pedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elec-
tions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994). 
 5. SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, 
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 67–68 (1998) (discussing the ways that less 
educated voters are confused with ballot initiatives); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DI-
RECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 
198 (1989) (“Like any other democratic institution, the initiative . . . [has its] 
shortcomings. Voters are sometimes confused.”). 
 6. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 5, at 48–55 (discussing ballot roll 
off). 
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casting incorrect votes7 on some measures.8 Overall, the empir-
ical evidence suggests that the prospects for voters casting 
competent votes on initiatives and referendums are quite poor.9
Despite the surfeit of data that indicts voters as incompe-
tent policymakers, Arthur Lupia’s seminal work has altered 
academics’ thinking about low-information voters in direct de-
mocracy.
 
10 Lupia demonstrates that low-information voters can 
cast competent votes without knowing specific facts about the 
measure as long as they have adequate cues, typically in the 
form of an endorsement for or against a ballot measure.11 Lupia 
surveys a small swath of Los Angeles voters concerning five re-
lated car insurance initiatives on the 1988 general election bal-
lot.12 His findings demonstrate the effectiveness of endorse-
ments: voters who acknowledged that they knew who endorsed 
which of the five 1988 insurance initiatives reported that they 
cast votes that are indistinguishable from votes cast by those 
voters who have “encyclopedic” knowledge of the initiatives.13 
Despite the fact that Lupia argues—in the same article and 
later14—that cues are not a panacea for voters’ low levels of in-
formation, his results in this one election have nonetheless be-
come the common academic wisdom: voters routinely use en-
dorsements to overcome their limited knowledge.15
 
 7. An individual casts an incorrect vote when she votes against her stat-
ed preference. 
  
 8. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: IS-
SUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 165 (1998) (“[Voters], when confused by bal-
lot issues, are likely to . . . cast votes that do not reflect their actual point of 
view.”); MAGLEBY, supra note 4. 
 9. For a review, see Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: 
Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus”, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003). 
 10. Lupia, supra note 4. 
 11. Id. at 65–66. 
 12. Id. at 63. 
 13. Id. at 63–64. 
 14. Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Ap-
proaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 469 (2004). 
 15. In his later work, Lupia carefully delineates the conditions when en-
dorsements will and will not be persuasive. See, e.g., ARTHUR LUPIA & 
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN 
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 184 (1998) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA] 
(finding that “a person’s willingness to follow a speaker’s advice depends 
strongly and regularly on that person’s perceptions of the speaker’s knowledge 
and trustworthiness”); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institu-
tional Foundations of Political Competence, in ELEMENTS OF REASON 47, 66 
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(Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (revealing that institutions can affect from 
whom citizens can learn in the political realm); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Recon-
structed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 111 (1994) (explaining how the inability of 
legislators to make accurate inferences about bureaucratic agents’ hidden 
knowledge makes legislators unable to manage bureaucratic policymaking); 
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Representation or Abdication? How 
Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 291, 
302 (1999) (explaining that not every piece of information is needed to make a 
reasoned decision but only enough to make effective political inferences); Ar-
thur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Who Controls? Information and the 
Structure of Legislative Decision Making, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361, 361 (1994) 
(stating that legislators often delegate policy making authority to experts and 
accept the experts’ proposals without question). Thus, our argument is not 
with Lupia, but his findings have been taken to be an unqualified endorse-
ment for the efficacy of endorsements, and this broader, unqualified view per-
meates legal scholarship and political science. See, e.g., DANIEL A. SMITH & 
CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 128 (2004) (“Scholars such as Arthur Lupia and Bowler and Donovan 
have found that voters can make decisions consistent with policy preferences 
in initiative elections by relying on available voter cues—such as the support 
or opposition by political parties, elected officials, political elites, interest 
groups, and the media . . . . [E]ven voters with less income and education can 
make informed decisions in initiative elections with very minimal information 
by relying on voter cues.”); Scott L. Althaus, Information Effects in Collective 
Preferences, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 545, 546 (1998) (“They can do this by taking 
cues from trusted political elites about which policies they should prefer and 
by harnessing a variety of heuristic strategies to deduce their political prefer-
ences, thus avoiding the need to infer preferences from factual bits of 
knowledge stored in long-term memory.” (citing, among others, Lupia, supra 
note 4)); James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Pub-
lic: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON, supra 
note 15, at 153, 155 (“Alternatively, [citizens] can consider the positions of in-
terest groups whose policy preference they are generally inclined to support or 
oppose. Such cues arguably eliminate the need for substantive information 
about an issue.” (citing Lupia, supra note 4)); John G. Matsusaka, Direct De-
mocracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 198 (2005) (“In fact, the evidence sug-
gests that information cues are fairly effective in allowing voters to make rea-
soned choices in the voting booth. In one of the most remarkable studies, 
Lupia . . . found that uninformed voters could emulate the voting patterns of 
informed voters simply by knowing the positions interest groups take 
. . . .” (citing Lupia, supra note 4)); Monika L. McDermott, Voting Cues in Low-
Information Elections: Candidate Gender as a Social Information Variable in 
Contemporary United States Elections, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 270, 270–71 (1997) 
(“For example, Lupia has shown that low-information voters can emulate the 
decision making of high-information voters by using easily obtained cues in an 
election. For complicated issues such as propositions or referenda, voters take 
cues from the backers and opponents of different measures. As a result, voters 
can still make decisions in line with their own preferences, without fully un-
derstanding a ballot measure. In the same way, voters can use cues about vir-
tually unknown candidates to decide among them.” (citing Lupia, supra note 
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Our previous research has demonstrated that accepting 
this conventional wisdom as the core of an argument in support 
of ballot measures is problematic and empirically untenable.16 
Our analysis of an initiative that proposed to modify Califor-
nia’s energy policy on the 2008 general election ballot shows 
that voters did not appear to use endorsements to arrive at a 
decision (though they seemed to vote in accordance with their 
policy preferences).17 Our results—while also covering a small 
number of respondents on only a few pieces of information—
call into question the assumption that voters’ use of endorse-
ments is widespread.18
Using a novel dataset, we test the hypothesis that voters 
routinely use endorsements to arrive at decisions on ballot 
measures. Our data cover three ballot measures across two 
elections in two states and represents one of the largest data 
sets assembled on the topic of voter knowledge and competence 
in direct democracy. Our first survey asks respondents about 
North Carolina’s Amendment 1 on the 2012 presidential prima-
ry ballot. In particular, we evaluate whether President Barack 
Obama’s or Governor Beverly Perdue’s public opposition to the 
constitutional amendment
  
19
 
4
 had a significant effect on our re-
spondents. For our second survey, we query Californians about 
Proposition 28, a constitutional amendment proposed by initia-
tive that attempted to alter the state’s legislative term limits, 
)). These five quotes represent just a fraction of the almost 1000 articles and 
books that cite Lupia’s seminal article. Combined, these five articles have ac-
cumulated more than 1100 citations themselves. 
 16. See generally Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L. J.: RULES, POL., 
& POL’Y 305 (2010) (suggesting that existing theories of voter choice, especially 
in direct democracy, may be inadequate). 
 17. See id. at 306 (finding that “whether or not voters knew the voting cue 
of the utility companies’ position against Proposition 7, [voters] were invaria-
ble in their ability to make vote choices that aligned with their stated policy 
preferences”). 
 18. See id. (concluding that most voters cast their votes consistent with 
their stated policy preferences even if they cannot recall cues such as en-
dorsements). 
 19. See Luke Johnson, Obama Opposes Amendment One, North Carolina 
Ballot Question Banning Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2012, 
4:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/16/obama-amendment-one 
-north-carolina-gay-marriage_n_1354302.html; Perdue on Amendment One: 
“We Look Like Mississippi”, WITN (May 11, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.witn 
.com/home/headlines/Perdue_On_Amendment_One__We_Look_Like_Mississip
pi_151122875.html (citing the governor’s opposition to Amendment 1). 
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and Proposition 29, an initiative that would create a statute 
that aimed to increase the existing excise tax on tobacco prod-
ucts.20
Importantly, our results highlight a major flaw with typi-
cal assessments of voters. For almost two decades, Lupia’s re-
sults have given license to many political observers to assume 
away one of the most important—and most consistently ob-
served—concerns with democracy: that states and localities are 
increasingly calling on voters to make informed decisions on 
complicated policy choices which they are woefully unprepared 
to consider. We need to test in observational studies the condi-
tions under which voters actually make informed decisions and 
then assess how commonly those conditions occur. Our research 
takes one small step toward this goal. We then need to propose 
and debate changes in our political institutions that reflect a 
broader understanding of the nuances of the conditions of per-
suasion, learning, and choice in elections regarding ballot 
measures. 
 For these two latter measures, we evaluate whether the 
endorsements from eight prominent groups in the state, such 
as the California Republican Party, had an effect on our re-
spondents’ vote choices. The interaction of cues and voter char-
acteristics on these three ballot measures yields fifteen tests 
regarding the effectiveness of endorsements. Of the fifteen tests 
of our hypotheses, we find that an endorsement has a signifi-
cant effect on vote choice in just seven instances. For the subset 
of the electorate for which the endorsement is effective, we of-
ten find the endorsement to be highly consequential, changing 
vote probabilities by as much as 50%. While our findings lead 
us to fine-tune the broad interpretations of Lupia’s research, 
they also allow us to study the conditionality of endorsements 
and heuristics in general. In the end, understanding the condi-
tionality of endorsements leads us to provide a number of policy 
prescriptions (e.g., including trustworthy endorsements on the 
ballot itself) that could help improve voters’ abilities to cast “in-
formed” votes on the increasing number of ballot measures they 
face. 
 
 20. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 
TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 2012, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 7 (2012), avail-
able at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2012p.pdf. 
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I.  THE CONDITIONAL EFFICACY OF ENDORSEMENTS   
For decades, the common assumption among scholars was 
that voters did not engage the political world in a meaningful 
way, and thus, voters were ill-equipped to make decisions on 
Election Day.21 Lupia challenges the notion that voters with 
limited information cannot make reasoned choices in elections, 
specifically on ballot measures, with important implications for 
candidates. Lupia and McCubbins formally define the condi-
tions under which third-party endorsements can substitute for 
knowledge.22 Using an agency-theory framework, Lupia and 
McCubbins demonstrate that cue-givers can persuade individ-
uals only when the endorsement meets certain conditions.23
The first condition is common interest. The individual re-
ceiving the endorsement must believe that she and the cue-
giver share a common interest—that is, the cue-giver and indi-
vidual both prefer the same outcome—regarding the choice at 
hand.
  
24
The second condition is knowledge. The individual must 
perceive the cue-giver to be a knowledgeable source of infor-
mation about the subject.
 The existence of common interests establishes trust be-
tween the cue-giver and the individual. If the cue-giver and in-
dividual lack a common interest (which happens often in poli-
tics), the cue-giver can still be persuasive when an external 
force or forces substitute for this common interest. An example 
of an external force that can substitute for common interest is a 
penalty for lying (e.g., perjury is a penalty for false testimony). 
If cue-givers can be penalized (e.g., a fine) for giving a false rec-
ommendation, the individual receiving the endorsement can be 
confident in the cue-giver’s sincerity. Additionally, the cue-
giver can establish trust if they undertake an observable and 
costly action to communicate their endorsement.  
25
 
 21. Most scholars attribute the genesis of this thinking to Converse, supra 
note 
 If the individual does not perceive 
the cue-giver to have knowledge that the individual desires, 
then the cue-giver will not be persuasive. Moreover, if the indi-
3, at 245 (concluding that large portions of the electorate do not have 
“meaningful beliefs” even on issues that have been extensively discussed by 
political elites). 
 22. See DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15. 
 23. See id. at 92. 
 24. Id. at 166–74. 
 25. Id. at 158–66. 
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vidual receiving the endorsements is already sure of her deci-
sion, the endorsement will not persuade the individual. 
Additional experimental work has shown that endorse-
ments can have dramatic effects on the quality of decisions. 
Endorsements are so effective, in fact, that uninformed indi-
viduals who learn of an endorsement often outperform their 
knowledgeable counterparts.26
As Lupia and McCubbins predict, however, usage of en-
dorsements by voters is not absolute.
 The potential value of endorse-
ments for individuals faced with a low-information decision 
cannot be overstated. 
27 In particular, the indi-
vidual may ignore an endorsement—despite the fact that the 
endorsement satisfies the trustworthy and knowledgeable con-
ditions—when she believes she can make the decision inde-
pendent of additional information.28 Moreover, in order for in-
dividuals to make use of endorsements, the endorsement must 
be easy to understand and must be readily accessible and cost-
less (or nearly costless) to acquire.29
While endorsements are effective in a controlled environ-
ment, their application in real-world elections is less explored. 
For candidate elections, party identification establishes com-
 Overall, the expectation 
from the experimental literature is that endorsements can lead 
to substantial improvements in individuals’ decisions so long as 
the two conditions for persuasion—common interest and 
knowledge—are satisfied.  
 
 26. For research that examines the values of endorsements, see GERD 
GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000); 
GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 
(2007); GERD GIGERENZER, RATIONALITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE 
WITH UNCERTAINTY (2008); GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC 
RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999); DEMO-
CRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15; Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do 
Cues Eliminate Differences Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citi-
zens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009); BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 
(Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2001).  
 27. DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 50.  
 28. Cheryl Boudreau, Gresham's Law of Political Communication: How 
Citizens Respond to Conflicting Information 21 n.19 (May 17, 2011) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1017977.  
 29. Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, & 
Nicholas Weller, Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Po-
litical Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 868, 
878–84 (2010).  
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mon interest with voters so long as the parties are responsi-
ble—that is, they do not radically change their policy positions 
from one election to the next.30 Party labels provide such a 
strong cue to voters that even the most dismally informed vot-
ers can arrive at a reasoned choice in partisan contests.31
In direct democracy, the burden for endorsements to be 
persuasive is substantially higher than in candidate elections 
due to the fact that, often, the cues available in direct democra-
cy elections fail to satisfy both of Lupia and McCubbins’s condi-
tions for persuasion. Many groups supporting and opposing bal-
lot measures fail to establish a common interest—and therefore 
trust—with voters.
 Party 
labels are the easiest cue for voters to understand and the 
cheapest to acquire: most voters share a common interest with 
one of the parties, and party labels appear directly on the bal-
lot, making party cues exceptionally accessible.  
32 For example, many interest groups concoct 
names to confuse voters and hide the group’s real interests.33
Further complicating matters, it is more difficult and costly 
for voters to acquire information in direct democracy elections. 
Unlike candidate contests, endorsements are not printed on the 
ballot for initiatives and referendums (though some states list 
the legislative votes for referendums). In order for voters to 
make use of endorsements they must have encountered the en-
dorsement before they cast their ballot, which, given the dearth 
of available information for many initiatives and referendums, 
is not always guaranteed. Further, they must also recall the 
 
Since many of the groups sponsoring and endorsing ballot 
measures lack the necessary external forces to establish trust, 
many cues are unpersuasive. 
 
 30. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 113 (1957).  
 31. SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND 
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 50–60 (2d ed. 1994). It is worth not-
ing that Popkin’s argument does not work as well in non-partisan contests. As 
McDermott shows, however, other cues available on the ballot can sometimes 
be valuable to voters’ decisions. Monika L. McDermott, Candidate Occupations 
and Voter Information Shortcuts, 67 J. POL. 201 (2005) (occupation of candi-
date); Monika L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elec-
tions, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895 (1998) (race and gender of candidate); McDermott, 
supra note 15 (candidate gender).  
 32. See Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make 
Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities, 4 PUB. WORKS 
MGMT. & POL’Y 39, 50 (2008); Garrett & Smith, supra note 1, at 298.  
 33. Garrett & Smith, supra note 1, at 306.  
  
1566 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1557 
 
endorsement at the point of decision. Accordingly, we expect 
that usage of endorsements in direct democracy will be far 
more limited when compared with prominent candidate con-
tests where some 80% or more of voters vote in accordance with 
their party preference.34
As noted above, however, the conventional wisdom in the 
academic literature stems from Lupia’s single study finding 
that voters use endorsements to make reasoned choices. Over 
Lupia’s own objections, scholars have cited his research to as-
sume away the salient problem of poor voter knowledge not on-
ly in direct democracy but also in most electoral contests. 
Lupia’s results, to be sure, are compelling and normatively ap-
pealing. In his examination of voters in Los Angeles, he discov-
ers that respondents who know that Ralph Nader endorsed one 
of the measures are just as likely to support the initiative when 
compared with voters who have a deeper level of knowledge.
  
35 
Similarly, he finds that voters who know that trial lawyers’ 
groups and insurance companies support the other measures 
are as likely to vote against the initiatives when compared with 
voters who know substantially more.36 In a related study, Karp 
finds that endorsements are conditional on whether the indi-
vidual has a positive or negative perception of the cue-giver 
(e.g., the mechanism that establishes trust with the voter).37
More recent empirical evidence, however, challenges the 
notion that voters’ use of endorsement in elections is wide-
spread. Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins show that, after ac-
counting for policy preferences, voters who know an endorse-
ment cast votes that are indistinguishable from voters who 
have no knowledge about the measure.
 
Taken together, these two studies paint a relatively optimistic 
picture of the uninformed and under-informed voter. 
38
 
 34. GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 119 
(7th ed., 2009).  
 Additionally, in three 
 35. Lupia, supra note 4, at 69–72. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative 
Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 149, 161 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).  
 38. Burnett, Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 16, at 317; see also Craig 
M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box: Perception of 
Ballot Measures Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion in California 
24–27 (July 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1884579.  
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survey experiments, Burnett and Parry find that a gubernato-
rial endorsement was effective for just one measure.39 These 
studies and our own here stand in direct opposition to Lupia’s 
findings.40
II.  TESTING THE EFFICACY OF ENDORSEMENTS IN 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY   
 
Overall, the empirical evidence concerning individuals’ use 
of endorsements to evaluate ballot measure is mixed. Here, we 
significantly add to the existing data and analysis of whether 
endorsements are effective in direct democracy. In what fol-
lows, we test the general hypothesis that individuals use en-
dorsements to inform their choices on ballot measures. Similar 
to Karp, we expect that the persuasiveness of an endorsement 
will be conditional on the individual’s perception of the cue-
giver.41
 
 For individuals who hold a positive view of the cue-
giver, our expectation is that they will vote in accordance with 
the cue-giver’s endorsement. Conversely, individuals who hold 
a negative assessment of the cue-giver will be more likely to 
vote against the interests of the cue-giver, effectively using the 
endorsement to do the opposite. More formally, our two hy-
potheses are: 
H1: Individuals who are aware of a cue-giver’s endorsement and have 
a positive view of the cue-giver will use that information to vote in ac-
cordance with the cue-giver’s endorsement.  
H2: Individuals who are aware of a cue-giver’s endorsement and have 
a negative view of the cue-giver will use that information to vote in 
opposition to the cue-giver’s endorsement. 
 
 39. Craig M. Burnett & Janine Parry, Gubernatorial Endorsements and 
Ballot Measure Approval (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144966.  
 40. It is worth noting that all studies are limited in their ability to assess 
how often individuals use endorsements. No study can hope to evaluate every 
endorsement that is available. As a result, these studies evaluate a subset of 
the available endorsements and find that among the most prominent en-
dorsements available to the broadest number of individuals, usage of en-
dorsements is limited. 
 41. Karp, supra note 37, at 161 (describing how a voter would respond to 
Tom Foley based on that voter’s perception of him). 
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A. DATA 
We use data from two surveys collected before the 2012 
presidential primaries in North Carolina (May 8) and Califor-
nia (June 5) to test our hypotheses. In our surveys, we asked 
respondents to report their knowledge of endorsements on 
three contentious ballot measures. For the first survey, we tar-
geted voting-eligible residents of North Carolina from April 27, 
2012, to May 3, 2012 (primaries were on May 8, 2012). We con-
tracted our sampling needs to Marketing Systems Group 
(MSG). MSG recruited an online sample of North Carolina res-
idents and directed the survey respondents to our survey host-
ed by Survey Gizmo. Overall, we collected a sample of 1066 re-
spondents over the week that our survey was in the field.42
On this survey, we asked potential voters about North 
Carolina’s Amendment 1, a legislatively referred constitutional 
amendment that would define marriage to be between one man 
and one woman.
 The 
response rate for this survey was 6%.  
43
 
 42. Non-probability samples are the subject of some debate in the survey 
research literature. Compare Stephen Ansolabehere & Brian F. Schaffner, 
Does Survey Mode Still Matter? Findings from a 2010 Multi-Mode Comparison 
23–24 (June 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1868229 (concluding that on-line opt-in 
surveys are as accurate as telephone and mailing surveys), with Neil Malhotra 
& Jon A. Krosnick, The Effect of Survey Mode and Sampling on Inferences 
About Political Attitudes and Behavior: Comparing the 2000 and 2004 ANES 
to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 286, 312 
(2007) (stating that results may differ considerably based on the survey meth-
od used and whether a probability or non-probability sample was used), and 
David S. Yeager et al., Comparing the Accuracy of RDD Telephone Surveys 
and Internet Surveys Conducted with Probability and Non-Probability Sam-
ples, 75 PUB. OPINION Q. 709, 731–32 (2011) (arguing that probability sur-
veys—either telephone or internet—are much more accurate than non-
probability surveys). The non-probability online sampling technique is similar 
to the methods that large political science surveys use (such as 
Polimetrix/YouGov and Knowledge Networks). Unlike these studies, however, 
our sample was not recruited for the specific purpose of completing a political 
survey. Instead, our sample consists of voting eligible adults in North Carolina 
and registered voters in California. While online samples are usually more po-
litically knowledgeable and interested in politics, this should bias our sample 
toward finding that our respondents knew the endorsements more often than 
the average voter. While our samples are convenience samples and not repre-
sentative, our samples match important demographic statistics for both states. 
For a comparison of our samples to relevant census statistics, see the online 
appendix located at http://mccubbins.us. 
 While North Carolina law already prohibited 
 43. Maxine Eichner et al., Potential Legal Impact of the Proposed Same-
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same-sex marriage, the Republican-controlled legislature 
sought to remove any legal questions surrounding the policy, 
including whether the state would have to recognize out-of-
state same-sex marriages.44 Some legislators felt the question 
was important enough that voters were the only suitable entity 
to decide the matter (voters must approve all constitutional 
amendments in North Carolina45). Two prominent politicians 
took public positions on the amendment: President Barack 
Obama opposed the amendment46 (he would later come out in 
favor of same-sex marriage outright) and Governor Beverly 
Perdue, a Democrat, also opposed the measure (though she has 
stated that she is not in favor of same-sex marriage).47
(1) Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported, op-
posed, or took no position on Amendment 1? (The correct answer is 
“opposed”) 
 As both 
are prominent political figures within the state, they satisfy the 
trustworthy condition (individuals can establish a common—or 
opposition—interest) and knowledgeability condition (both are 
policy experts) necessary for persuasion. To gauge whether our 
respondents were aware of their positions, we asked the follow-
ing questions:  
(2) Do you happen to know if Governor Beverly Perdue supported, op-
posed, or took no position on Amendment 1? (The correct answer is 
“opposed”) 
Our second survey targeted registered voters in California 
just before the 2012 presidential primary on June 5, 2012. The 
process was identical to our North Carolina survey, we con-
tracted the sampling to MSG, which sent respondents to our 
survey hosted on Survey Gizmo. We started our survey collec-
tion efforts about a week before the election (May 30, 2012) and 
ended just before Election Day (June 4, 2012). In all, we gath-
ered surveys from 1165 registered California voters. 
 
Sex Marriage Amendment to the North Carolina Constitution, ACLU OF N. 
CAROLINA 1 (June 6, 2011), available at http://www.acluofnc.org/files/Final% 
20Marriage%20Amendment%20Report%202.pdf. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. N.C. CONST. art II, § 22, cl. 2. 
 46. Rob Christensen & Tim Funk, Obama Opposes N.C. Marriage 
Amendment Proposal, NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www 
.newsobserver.com/2012/03/16/1936718/obama-opposes-amendment-
one.html#storylink=misearch. 
 47. Craig Jarvis, Perdue Opposes Marriage Amendment, NEWS & OB-
SERVER, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/10/08/1548617/ 
perdue-opposes-marriage-amendment.html#storylink=misearch. 
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We asked respondents on this survey about Propositions 28 
and 29. Proposition 28—which was strikingly similar in con-
struction to California’s Proposition 93 that failed in 2008—was 
an initiative that proposed to modify California’s constitution to 
lengthen the amount of time a legislator could serve in a single 
house of the California State Legislature.48 The measure pro-
posed that a legislator could serve up to twelve years in either 
the Senate or Assembly.49 Existing law permitted legislators to 
serve six years in the Assembly and eight years in the Senate, a 
total of fourteen years for lawmakers elected to both houses.50 
Thus, the measure would reduce the total number of years an 
elected representative could serve in the legislature from four-
teen to twelve.51
A number of prominent groups in California took a stance 
on Proposition 28. The California Republican Party voted to 
oppose the measure publicly as a part of the party’s official po-
sitions.
 In effect, Proposition 28 aimed to allow legisla-
tors to serve all of their years in a single house, an outcome 
proponents argued would strike a balance between the legisla-
ture’s need for stability and expertise while preserving the 
goals of term limits (e.g., turnover in office and better represen-
tation). 
52 California Common Cause and the League of Women 
Voters of California each supported the legislation, promoted 
its passage, and signed the official ballot pamphlet’s argument 
in support of the measure.53 While the California Republican 
Party meets the two conditions for persuasion,54
 
 48. California Ballot Propositions, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (June 5, 2012), 
http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures/proposition-28. 
 the other two 
interest groups mentioned will be persuasive for a subset of the 
population. Common Cause often takes public positions on bal-
lot measures and policy outcomes (for example, Common Cause 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (reducing the total number of years an elected official could serve 
by two years). 
 52. Sue Caro, Proposition 28: Our Party Urges a “NO” Vote on This Decep-
tive Initiative, PIEDMONTPATCH (June 2, 2012, 2:44 AM), http://piedmont 
.patch.com/blog_posts/proposition-28-our-party-urges-a-no-vote-on-this 
-deceptive-initiative. 
 53. Prop 28: Should We Change the California Legislature’s Term Limits?, 
S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (May 29, 2012), http://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/ 
2012/05/29/26672/prop-28-seeks-to-change-california-legislatures-te/. 
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.  
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engineered the approval of a non-partisan redistricting com-
mission in California), but only some individuals will share 
common interests with the group. The League of Women Vot-
ers, a group that often promotes the spread of election infor-
mation, is a knowledgeable source of policy outcomes (they 
write independent summaries of how ballot measures will af-
fect the state before each election) but, again, not every voter 
will share a common interest with the group. We asked three 
questions to estimate whether our respondents were aware of 
these endorsements: 
(3) Do you happen to know if the California Republican Party sup-
ported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The correct 
answer is “opposed”) 
(4) Do you happen to know if California Common Cause supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The correct answer is 
“supported”) 
(5) Do you happen to know if the League of Women Voters of Califor-
nia supported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 28? (The 
correct answer is “supported”) 
We also asked voters about Proposition 29, a statutory ini-
tiative that proposed an additional $1 excise tax on tobacco 
products.55 Proposition 29 promised to raise California’s excise 
tax on a pack of cigarettes from $0.87 to $1.87, which would 
have increased taxes collected on tobacco products by about 
$860 million per year.56 The lion’s share of the revenues raised 
by the additional tax would go toward general cancer research, 
research on tobacco-related diseases, and public education and 
tobacco abatement projects.57
Similar to Proposition 28, a number of prominent organiza-
tions took a public position on Proposition 29. RJ Reynolds, the 
tobacco conglomerate, opposed the measure, contributing over 
$11 million to defeat it (a number bested only by fellow tobacco 
conglomerate Altria/Philip Morris).
 
58
 
 55. Elizabeth Hartfield, California Proposition 29 to Raise Tax on Ciga-
rettes Has Voters Divided, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2012, 4:37 AM), http://abcnews 
.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/california-split-on-proposition-29-to-raise-tax-on 
-cigarettes/. 
 Some individuals will find 
 56. Phil Willon, Vote Remains Close on Prop. 29 Tobacco Tax Ballot Initia-
tive, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2012, 1:01 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
california-politics/2012/06/vote-remains-right-on-tobacco-tax-ballot 
-initiative.html. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Cigarette Showdown as Californians Vote on Tax, CNN (June 5, 2012, 
11:59 AM) [hereinafter Cigarette Showdown], http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/05/ 
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RJ Reynolds persuasive because the company’s position against 
raising taxes on tobacco products is well known. Many individ-
uals have strong feelings about tobacco companies and thus 
know whether they should accept or reject RJ Reynolds’s oppo-
sition to the measure. The American Heart Association (AHA) 
supported Proposition 29’s passage, explaining that the addi-
tional funds would help researchers reduce the number of to-
bacco related deaths.59 Over the years, the AHA has become one 
of the definitive sources for compiling and analyzing research 
on tobacco and heart disease, making the AHA a knowledgea-
ble source of information. Many individuals share a common in-
terest with the AHA, as their stance on tobacco use (and the 
benefits of tobacco taxation) is well known and long-standing. 
The AHA donated over $500,000 to support the measure’s pas-
sage.60 The California Republican Party opposed the measure, 
making its position known by officially adopting an adversarial 
stance to the initiative.61 As above, the California Republican 
Party easily meets the conditions necessary for persuasion. The 
Lance Armstrong Foundation supported the measure, making a 
large $1.5 million donation.62 The Lance Armstrong Foundation 
has a long history of supporting cancer research and promoting 
an active and healthy lifestyle. While some voters will share 
common interests with the foundation and will perceive the 
foundation to be knowledgeable, some voters will not. Such a 
large and public donation (i.e., a costly signal), however, satis-
fies the necessary conditions for persuasion. Finally, Grover 
Norquist and his interest group Americans for Tax Reform op-
posed the measure.63
 
us/california-cigarette-tax. 
 A prominent political figure and interest 
group, many voters are likely to share common interests with 
Norquist. Additionally, Norquist is a tax policy expert, most 
famously known for his ability to gather pledges from legisla-
 59. Id. 
 60. Stephen Stock et al., The Investigative Unit Follows Prop 29 Money 
Trail, NBC BAY AREA (June 4, 2012, 6:32 AM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/ 
investigations/The-Investigative-Unit-Follows-Prop-29-Money-Trail 
--156450895.html. 
 61. California Ballot Propositions, CALIFORNIA CHOICES (June 5, 2012), 
http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures/proposition-29. 
 62. Cigarette Showdown, supra note 58. 
 63. Dan Morain, Op-Ed, Big Tobacco Fires Up Anti-Tax Effort, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2012/04/ 
15/4413061/big-tobacco-fires-up-anti-tax.html. 
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tors to never raise taxes. To assess whether voters were aware 
of these endorsements, we asked the following questions: 
(6) Do you happen to know if RJ Reynolds supported, opposed, or took 
no position on Proposition 29? (The correct answer is “opposed”) 
(7) Do you happen to know if the American Heart Association sup-
ported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct 
answer is “supported”) 
(8) Do you happen to know if the California Republican Party sup-
ported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct 
answer is “opposed”) 
(9) Do you happen to know if the Lance Armstrong Foundation sup-
ported, opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct 
answer is “supported”) 
(10) Do you happen to know if Americans for Tax Reform supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Proposition 29? (The correct answer is 
“opposed”) 
In addition to the questions we use to measure knowledge 
of endorsements, we also asked our respondents one factual 
knowledge question for each of the ballot measures. We use 
these questions to assess whether respondents could recall de-
tails about each ballot measure. In the words of Lupia, these 
questions assess whether respondents have “encyclopedic 
knowledge.”64 For Amendment 1 on the 2012 North Carolina 
presidential primary survey, we asked voters whether they un-
derstood that North Carolina already prohibited same-sex mar-
riage. As we note earlier, Amendment 1 did not propose to 
change the status quo.65
(11) To the best of your knowledge, do you know if North Carolina law 
currently prohibits same-sex marriage? (The correct answer is “Yes, 
state law prohibits same-sex marriage”) 
 Instead, the state legislature proposed 
the referendum so that the existing law would become a per-
manent amendment to the state’s constitution. To assess 
whether voters understood this fact, we asked: 
For Proposition 28 on the 2012 California presidential pri-
mary survey, we asked whether voters understood that Cali-
fornia had already enacted term limits. Proposition 28 proposed 
to alter the existing term limit laws, not remove them or enact 
term limits where none existed.66
 
 64. Lupia, supra note 
 Thus, the question we asked 
4, at 63. 
 65. See Eichner et al., supra note 43, at 4 (arguing that the sponsor’s goal 
was to put the statutory prohibition in the Constitution but that the actual 
impact could be much greater). 
 66. California Ballot Propositions, supra note 48. 
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of our respondents gauges whether they understood the status 
quo policy in California regarding limits on how long elected 
representatives are allowed to serve in the state legislature. 
(12) Do you happen to know if state legislators in California are sub-
ject to term limits—that is, a maximum amount of time they can 
serve in the state legislature? (The correct answer is a “Yes, state leg-
islators are subject to term limits”) 
Our final factual knowledge question concerns Proposition 
29 on the 2012 California presidential primary survey. Similar 
to the previous two questions, we wanted to measure whether 
our respondents knew the status quo of the policy in question. 
Proposition 29 proposed to increase the existing excise tax on 
tobacco products.67
(13) Do you happen to know if California currently collects an excise 
tax on tobacco purchases, above and beyond the regular sales tax on 
goods? (The correct answer is a “Yes, California currently has an ex-
cise tax on tobacco products”) 
 Accordingly, we asked our respondents to 
report their knowledge concerning the existence of an excise 
tax on tobacco products. 
We asked these factual knowledge questions to measure 
the relative depth of knowledge that our respondents possessed 
regarding the ballot measures on our surveys. These questions 
allow us to estimate whether respondents who knew a fact re-
port a vote choice that is different when compared with re-
spondents who had knowledge of an endorsement or no 
knowledge of either an endorsement or a fact.  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we employ a post-test-only 
non-equivalent group design. Our design estimates the effect of 
information—that is, knowledge of an endorsement and 
knowledge of facts—on vote choice. Identical to Lupia, our 
treatment is knowledge of an endorsement.68
 
 67. Hartfield, supra note 
 Unlike Lupia, 
however, we cannot assume to know our respondents’ prefer-
ences with regards to their evaluations of the relevant cue giv-
ers (Lupia’s model assumes a near-universal dislike of both 
lawyers and insurance companies and, conversely, a near-
55. 
 68. See Lupia, supra note 4, at 68 (describing that one of the variables po-
tential voters used in making their decision was “knowledge of an information-
provider’s preferences”). 
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unanimous trust in a Ralph-Nader-led consumer group69). In-
stead, we argue that our respondents’ use of endorsements to 
arrive at a decision will be conditional on their evaluation of 
the cue-giver, as Lupia and McCubbins demonstrate.70
To implement this design feature, we ask our respondents 
to assess the cue-givers. For President Obama and Governor 
Perdue we asked respondents about how they perceived the 
president’s and governor’s job performance. For the remainder 
of the endorsements—composed largely of interest groups, po-
litical parties, and corporations—we queried respondents about 
how they perceived the group. Similar to a feeling thermome-
ter, we asked respondents to indicate whether they had a posi-
tive, negative, or neutral perception of the entire group. For 
these endorsements, we separate our respondents into two 
groups: one composed of respondents with a positive view of the 
cue-giver, and a second that contains respondents who hold a 
negative view of the cue-giver (we have no prediction for neu-
tral respondents).  
 To ac-
count for this conditional use of endorsements, we divide our 
respondents into multiple subgroups. As an example, consider 
President Obama’s opposition to North Carolina’s same-sex 
marriage ban (Amendment 1). For this endorsement, we sepa-
rate our respondents into two groups: one group composed of 
respondents who approve of the president’s job performance, 
and a second group that contains only respondents who disap-
prove of the president’s job performance. For the first group 
that contains respondents who approve of the president’s per-
formance, we expect that the treated respondents—those re-
spondents who were aware of his opposition to the measure—
will be more likely to oppose the measure when compared with 
respondents who did not receive the treatment. For the second 
group that contains only respondents who disapprove of the 
president, treated respondents will be more likely to vote in fa-
vor of the amendment when compared with untreated respond-
ents—in effect, the treated respondents in this group will be 
more likely to do the opposite of what the president suggests. 
By splitting our sample into subgroups based on our re-
spondents’ assessment of the cue-giver, we avoid making the 
 
 69. Id. at 72. 
 70. See DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 15, at 68 (arguing that “per-
suasion requires a perception of knowledge and a basis for trust”).  
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assumption that the propensity to know the endorsement is 
equally distributed between two groups. If we handle our sam-
ple as if the distribution of propensity scores are identical be-
tween the groups, we would be assuming that certain subsets of 
individuals are more (or less) likely to learn specific endorse-
ments compared with other types of individuals, which is unre-
alistic. 
While splitting the sample into subgroups controls for the 
difference in propensity scores between groups, we must also 
account for within group propensity score imbalances to 
achieve a true quasi-experimental test. To that end, we match 
respondents who received our treatment (knowledge of a cue) 
with respondents who did not receive our treatment (no 
knowledge of a cue) on common demographic variables (age, in-
come, education, party identification, ideology, gender, political 
knowledge, and state level political knowledge).71 To implement 
our matching equation, we use the GenMatch72 package for R 
as implemented by MatchIt73
What does matching provide us that a simple regression 
without matching cannot? Matching, in essence, ensures that 
we achieve excellent covariate balance between the treatment 
(knew an endorsement) and control (no knowledge of an en-
dorsement) groups. As a result, we can be confident that any 
findings we uncover in our analysis are not the result of a co-
variate imbalance between our treatment and control groups.  
 to create the best matches be-
tween our treatment and control groups based on our matching 
equation.  
After we match respondents in the treatment and control 
groups using GenMatch, we run a series of logit regressions to 
estimate whether our treatment has an effect on vote choice. 
Formally, the structure of the logit regression equation is  
 
 71. Only Propositions 28 and 29 include state level political knowledge as 
a covariate in the matching algorithm. We did not include measures of state 
level political knowledge on the other surveys. 
 72. Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating 
Causal Effects: A General Multivariate Matching Method of Achieving Balance 
in Observational Studies, REV. ECON & STAT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), 
available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00318.  
 73. See Daniel Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for 
Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALY-
SIS 199, 202 (2007) (stating that MatchIt is “available as an open source and 
free R package”). 
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Pr (𝑦𝑖𝑧 = 1) = 11+𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑸𝑖𝑧+𝛽2𝑿𝑖𝑧)                          (1) 
In Equation (1), Pr(yiz = 1) is a respondent’s estimated 
probability of supporting a ballot measure, where i identifies a 
specific respondent and z denotes a specific ballot measure. 
Since this is a binary choice, a “1” indicates a “yes” vote and “0” 
represents a “no” vote on proposition z. In the equation, Q is a 
matrix of dichotomous variables that indicate whether re-
spondent i was aware of one of the endorsements related to bal-
lot measure z. The number of variables contained in matrix Q 
varies from three (Amendment 1 of 2012) to five (Proposition 29 
of 2012). The final term, denoted by X, is a matrix of covariates. 
This matrix of covariates differs for each ballot measure. For all 
ballot measures, X includes dichotomous variables identifying 
whether respondent i is a Liberal, a Conservative, and whether 
she was aware of the fact or facts relating to proposition z; it al-
so contains standard measures of Age, Education, Income, and 
Political Knowledge.74 For Amendment 1 of North Carolina 
(2012), X includes measures of Party Identification.75 Finally, 
for Propositions 28 and 29, X includes a measure of State Level 
Political Knowledge.76
 
 74. Political Knowledge for Amendment 1 (NC, 2012) is the percentage of 
correct answers to the following questions:  
 Equation (1), then, allows us to test 
(1) Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or 
not? 
(2) Do you happen to know what job or office Harry Reid currently 
holds?  
(3) How much of a majority of both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate are required to override a presidential veto? 
(4) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the 
House of Representatives in Washington, DC? 
(5) Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?  
(6) Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court?  
For Propositions 28 and 29 (CA, 2012), the variable is similar to Amendment 1 
(NC, 2012) except that it includes one additional question: Do you happen to 
know which party has the most members in the Senate in Washington, DC? 
 75. Including Party Identification with Propositions 28 and 29 created 
collinearity problems with ideology. 
 76. State Level Political Knowledge for Propositions 28 and 29 is the per-
centage of correct responses to the following questions:  
(1) Do you happen to know who is the current Speaker of the Califor-
nia Assembly? 
(2) Do you happen to know who is the current Secretary of State of 
California? 
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whether knowing an endorsement had an effect on our re-
spondents independent of our control variables. Figure 1 below 
summarizes our research design. 
 
Figure 1 
Summary of Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. RESULTS 
We present our results in two steps. First, we report sum-
mary statistics of how much our respondents knew about each 
ballot measure. That is, we tabulate the percentage of correct 
responses to our endorsement and factual-knowledge questions. 
Second, we present our regression results with our matched 
samples for each ballot measure. To provide context to these 
regressions, we calculate and present the marginal effect that 
knowledge of the cues had on vote choice for each measure. 
We begin our analysis by presenting the percentage of cor-
rect answers to the endorsement and factual-knowledge ques-
tions we asked for all ballot measures. These data, shown in 
Table 1 below, represent the largest collection of survey re-
sponses concerning how much voters know about ballot 
measures assembled to date. Table 1 presents a number of in-
teresting findings. With regards to Amendment 1 of North Car-
olina (2012), our respondents’ knowledge of the measure’s en-
dorsements was quite poor, but knowledge of the policy status 
quo was widespread. For Proposition 28 (2012), knowledge of 
the three endorsements was limited; again, however, 
 
(3) Do you happen to know who is the current Lieutenant Governor of 
California?  
(4) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the 
California Assembly?  
(5) Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the 
California Senate? 
(6) Do you happen to know who is the current President Pro Tempore 
of the California Senate? 
Full Sample 
Positive Assessment of 
Cue-Giver Genetic Matching 
Regression Analysis of 
Endorsement Effects 
Negative Assessment of 
Cue-Giver Genetic Matching 
Regression Analysis of 
Endorsement Effects 
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knowledge of the policy status quo was common. Finally, 
knowledge of the endorsements pertaining to Proposition 29 
(2012) was mixed: three of the endorsements were not well 
known, but a majority of our respondents knew the endorse-
ments from the American Heart Association and the Lance 
Armstrong Foundation. As was the case with Amendment 1 
and Proposition 28, knowledge of the policy status quo concern-
ing Proposition 29 was well known. Overall, then, the results in 
Table 1 lead to two general conclusions about our data. First, 
knowledge of endorsements varies substantially across and 
within ballot measures.77
 
 Second, knowledge of a policy’s status 
quo is also strikingly widespread. In fact, our respondents were 
able to identify the status quo policy correctly 64% to 71% of 
the time.  
  
 
 77. It is possible, of course, that some respondents could simply infer the 
positions of these groups (equating to an educated guess). These results, how-
ever, largely conform to what we have found in previous research, especially 
with regards to knowledge of the governor’s endorsement. See Burnett & Par-
ry, supra note 39. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Correct Responses to Endorsement 
and Factual Knowledge Questions 
 
Question Description Ballot Measure % Correct 
President Obama Opposed (Cue) Amendment 1 (NC, 2012) 40 
Governor Beverly Perdue Opposed (Cue) Amendment 1 (NC, 2012) 42.4 
NC Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage Already 
(Fact) 
Amendment 1 (NC, 2012) 70.2 
CA Republican Party Opposed (Cue) Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) 32.8 
CA Common Cause Supported (Cue) Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) 32.6 
CA League of Women Voters Supported (Cue) Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) 39.3 
California has Term Limits in Place (Fact) Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) 64.2 
RJ Reynolds Opposed (Cue) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 43.5 
American Heart Association Supported (Cue) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 66 
CA Republican Party Opposed (Cue) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 24.1 
Lance Armstrong Foundation Supported (Cue) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 55.5 
Americans for Tax Reform Opposed (Cue) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 20.3 
CA has Excise Tax on Tobacco Already (Fact) Proposition 29 (CA, 2012) 71 
Note: We calculate the percentage of correct responses to these ques-
tions based on the respondents who are eligible for regression analy-
sis after matching. The sample sizes are as follows: Amendment 1 
(NC, 2012) N=778; Proposition 28 (CA, 2012) N=684; Proposition 29 
(CA, 2012) N=1012. 
 
Before running our regressions, we implemented genetic 
matching. By matching on exogenous covariates, we aim to im-
prove the comparability of our treatment (knew an endorse-
ment) and control (did not know an endorsement) groups for 
each of the three ballot measures. While we do not present here 
all of the details for our matching results due to their length, a 
full description of the covariate and propensity score improve-
ments is available in an online appendix.78
 
 78. The online appendix can be found at http://mccubbins.us.  
 To provide a snap-
shot of how well our matching algorithm worked, we present 
the improvement in distance—that is, the propensity to receive 
the treatment—for the treatment and control groups for each 
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subgroup we examine below. As Table 2 shows, the distribution 
of propensity scores between treatment and control groups im-
proves substantially for each treatment condition. Table 2, in 
conjunction with our online appendix, demonstrates that the 
matching process helps our ability to produce comparable 
groups. 
 
Table 2 
Improvement in Mean Propensity Scores with  
Genetic Matching 
 
Matched Treatment Condition 
 
Mean Propensity  
Difference Pre 
Mean Propensity 
Difference Post 
Percent Improvement 
 
NC Amendment 1, Approve 
Obama 0.079 0.003 95.8 
NC Amendment 1, Disapprove 
Obama 0.064 0.004 94.5 
NC Amendment 1, Approve Per-
due 0.077 0.003 95.5 
NC Amendment 1, Disapprove 
Perdue 0.077 0.002 97.0 
CA Prop. 28, Positive Republi-
cans 0.095 0.010 89.9 
CA Prop. 28, Negative Republi-
cans 0.082 0.006 92.6 
CA Prop. 28, Positive Common 
Cause 0.091 0.000 99.6 
CA Prop. 28, Positive LWV 0.099 0.003 96.7 
CA Prop. 29, Positive Republi-
cans 0.110 0.006 94.5 
CA Prop. 29, Negative Republi-
cans 0.104 0.004 96.1 
CA Prop. 29, Positive AHA 0.084 0.004 94.7 
CA Prop. 29, Positive Lance 
Armstrong 0.040 0.006 84.4 
CA Prop. 29, Negative Lance 
Armstrong 0.183 0.028 84.7 
CA Prop. 29, Negative Tobacco 0.248 0.017 93.1 
CA Prop. 29, Positive Americans 
for Tax Reform 0.126 0.010 92.3 
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We turn now to present the logit regression results based 
on Equation (1) for each measure. We also calculate the proba-
bility of voting in favor of each measure by varying our re-
spondents’ knowledge of endorsements. We begin by analyzing 
the regression results for North Carolina’s Amendment 1 
(2012) that proposed to modify the state’s constitution to out-
law same-sex marriage. As Table 3 shows, our respondents’ use 
of endorsements is not universal. For respondents who ap-
proved of Obama’s job performance (Model 1), respondents who 
were aware of his opposition to the measure were significantly 
less likely to vote for the amendment. For respondents who dis-
approved of Obama (Model 2), knowing Obama’s opposition led 
to significantly more support for the amendment. By contrast, 
respondents who both approved (Model 3) and disapproved 
(Model 4) of the governor’s job performance were unlikely to 
use her endorsement to arrive a decision. For these two models, 
ideology and partisanship appear to be more important predic-
tors of vote choice. Notably, respondents’ knowledge of the fact 
we asked about concerning the referendum’s status quo had no 
discernible effect on vote choice. For all four models, knowing a 
homosexual personally had a strong and negative effect on our 
respondents’ apparent support for the initiative.  
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Table 3 
Logit Results for Vote on North Carolina’s Same-Sex 
Marriage Amendment (Amendment 1, 2012) 
 
 Model (1) 
Approve 
Obama 
Model (2) 
Disapprove 
Obama 
Model (3) 
Approve Per-
due 
Model (4) 
Disapprove 
Perdue 
Cue: Obama Opposed -1.31** 0.75* — — 
 (0.43) (0.33) — — 
Cue: Perdue Opposed — — 0.06 0.07 
 — — (0.28) (0.27) 
Fact: NC Prohibits 
SSM 
0.11 -0.29 0.37 0.37 
 (0.51) (0.37) (0.31) (0.28) 
Democrat 0.15 1.07 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.54) (0.91) (0.36) (0.34) 
Republican -0.60 0.71* 0.73* 0.15 
 (1.06) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) 
Conservative 0.78 1.48** 0.97** 1.05** 
 (0.90) (0.35) (0.31) (0.31) 
Liberal -1.75** -0.11 -1.56** -1.66** 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.39) (0.36) 
Age 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income -0.08 -0.22 -0.08 -0.15 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Education -0.18 0.15 0.00 0.16 
 (0.20) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
Knows Homosexual -1.77** -0.86* -1.17** -0.99** 
 (0.48) (0.37) (0.32) (0.33) 
Political Knowledge -0.98 -0.47 -0.24 -0.84* 
 (0.76) (0.49) (0.42) (0.42) 
Constant 2.43* -1.08 0.14 -0.15 
 (1.17) (0.74) (0.71) (0.69) 
Pseudo-R2 .237 .221 .268 .235 
N 175 286 393 412 
Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of 
voting in favor or against North Carolina’s Amendment 1 that pro-
posed to modify the state’s constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage.
 Excluded group: independents who were unaware of the endorse-
ment or fact.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
To provide context to these results, we calculate the proba-
bility of voting in favor of Amendment 1 by using SPost for 
Stata.79
 
 79. See J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CAT-
 We estimate these probabilities by varying knowledge 
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of Obama’s and Perdue’s position and holding all other varia-
bles at their mean value. As Figure 2 shows, knowledge of Pres-
ident Obama’s endorsement has a substantial effect on vote 
choice for both individuals who approve (21% decrease in the 
probability of voting in favor of the measure) and disapprove 
(17% increase) of his job performance; both effects are in the 
expected direction. Governor Perdue’s endorsement, however, 
was not significant. Taken together, Table 2 and Figure 2 pro-
vide mixed support for our hypotheses: if you can get the presi-
dent to endorse a policy on the ballot, it may have a substantial 
effect on the vote (notice, however, that it is a two-edged-sword 
in that the cut is positive for the president’s supporters and 
negative for his opponents).  
 
Figure 2 
Probability of Voting in Favor of North Carolina 
Same-Sex Marriage Amendment (Amendment 1, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (2d ed. 2006).  
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We turn now to present the regression results for Califor-
nia’s Proposition 28 (2012) in Table 4.80 Similar to the previous 
ballot measure, the endorsements we asked about had a mixed 
effect on our respondents. In particular, respondents who had a 
positive view of the California Republican Party and knew that 
the party opposed the measure were less likely to support the 
initiative; respondents who had a negative assessment of the 
Republican Party, however, were unaffected by their endorse-
ment. Similarly, respondents who were aware that Common 
Cause supported the proposition and had a positive view of the 
group did not seem to use that endorsement to arrive at a deci-
sion. Finally, knowing that the California League of Women 
Voters supported the measure had no effect on respondents 
who held a positive view of the group. It is also worth noting 
that knowledge of the key facts regarding Proposition 28 had 
no effect on vote choice. When we plot the predicted probabili-
ties of support for Proposition 28 in Figure 3, it becomes clear 
that only one endorsement for one subgroup—respondents who 
knew the California Republican Party’s opposition and had a 
positive view of the party—has a large substantive effect on 
vote choice. The other regressions find no support for our hy-
potheses. As such, the results for Proposition 28 provide mini-
mal support for our expectations.81
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80. Unfortunately, there were not enough respondents who had a negative 
impression of Common Cause or the League of Women Voters to analyze the 
effect of their endorsements on those subgroups.  
 81. It is possible that some endorsements are more useful than others. For 
Proposition 28, only the California Republican Party’s endorsement had a sig-
nificant effect on vote choice. While one endorsement may be effective enough 
to improve the decisions of everyone, our results suggest this is not the case: 
the majority of voters do not find even this potentially powerful endorsement 
persuasive (or, they report not being aware of it altogether). 
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Table 4 
Logit Results for California’s Term Limits Amend-
ment (Proposition 28, 2012) 
 
 Model (1) 
Positive  
CA Republicans 
Model (2) 
Negative CA Re-
publicans 
Model (3) 
Positive Common 
Cause 
Model (4) 
Positive 
CA LWV 
Cue: Republicans 
Opposed 
-1.90** -0.01 — — 
 (0.72) (0.40) — — 
Cue: Common 
Cause Supported 
— — 0.95 — 
 — — (0.65) — 
Cue: LWV Sup-
ported 
— — — 0.07 
 — — — (0.37) 
Fact: CA has 
Term Limits 
-1.16 -0.05 1.24 0.44 
 (0.80) (0.36) (0.84) (0.37) 
Conservative -0.89 0.60 0.08 0.80 
 (0.66) (0.84) (1.02) (0.59) 
Liberal 0.28 0.24 -0.32 0.83* 
 (1.48) (0.39) (0.76) (0.42) 
Age -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Income -0.05 0.14 -0.33 0.18 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.27) (0.13) 
Education 0.21 0.16 0.50 0.04 
 (0.30) (0.19) (0.30) (0.17) 
Political 
Knowledge 
-1.11 -0.65 -0.69 -0.25 
 (1.25) (0.79) (1.06) (0.83) 
CA Political 
Knowledge 
-1.80 0.04 1.78 0.05 
 (1.22) (0.63) (1.31) (0.73) 
Constant 5.41 0.82 1.30 0.76 
 (2.04) (0.97) (1.68) (0.89) 
Pseudo-R2 .308 .020 .152 .055 
N 70 218 126 266 
Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of voting 
in favor or against California’s Proposition 28 that proposed to modify the 
state’s constitution to restructure the term limit rules for California’s 
elected officials. Excluded group: independents who were unaware of any 
of the endorsements or fact. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 3 
Probability of Voting in Favor of California’s Term 
Limits Amendment (Proposition 28, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 reports the logit regression results for California’s 
Proposition 29 (2012).82
 
 82. As was the case with Proposition 28, we did not have enough respond-
ents to analyze some of the subgroups, including (1) the effect of the American 
Heart Association’s endorsement on respondents who had a negative view of 
the group; (2) respondents who had a positive view of tobacco companies and 
knew their opposition; and (3) respondents who had a negative view of Ameri-
cans for Tax Reform and knew their opposition to the measure.  
 Similar to our previous results, only 
some of the endorsements we asked about had a significant ef-
fect on vote choice. Knowing the California Republican Party’s 
opposition to the measure had a significant and large (38% de-
crease) effect on respondents who had a positive view of the 
party (the effect was in the expected direction). Identical to 
Proposition 28 above, respondents who had a negative view of 
the Republican Party did not appear to use their endorsement 
to arrive at a decision. Respondents who knew the American 
Heart Association endorsed the measure and had a positive 
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view of the group (Model 3) were significantly more likely to 
support the measure. The Lance Armstrong Foundation’s sup-
port for the measure had a significant effect as well: respond-
ents who had a positive view of the group were more likely to 
support the measure (Model 4) and respondents who had a 
negative view of the group were less likely to support the addi-
tional tax (Model 5). By contrast, RJ Reynolds’ endorsement 
(Model 6) and Americans for Tax Reform’s endorsement (Model 
7) had no significant effect on our respondents. In addition to 
the endorsements, knowing that California had already insti-
tuted an excise tax on tobacco products resulted in lower sup-
port for the additional tax in two of the models. Self-identified 
tobacco users were also significantly less likely to support the 
initiative in six out of the seven models. When we calculate the 
predicted probabilities for voting in favor of Proposition 29, it 
becomes clear that knowledge of an endorsement can have a 
substantively very large effect, but again this effect is limited 
to people who self-identify as supporting or opposing the person 
or group endorsing the measure. In fact, knowing that the Cali-
fornia Republican Party’s opposed the measure resulted in a 
decline in support for the measure of over fifty percentage 
points for respondents who had a positive view of the party. 
While we find mixed support for the efficacy of endorsements, it 
is clear that an endorsement can have a significant effect when 
it comes from a well-known source with whom people can iden-
tify their relationship to the cue-giver. For many ballot 
measures, however, endorsements by presidents, political par-
ties and campaigns by well-known groups or individuals, 
spending tens of millions of dollars, do not emerge.  
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Table 5—Logit Results for California’s Tobacco Ex-
cise Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012) 
 
 Model (1) 
Positive  
CA Republicans 
Model (2) 
Negative 
CA Republicans 
Model (3) 
Positive 
American 
Heart Assn. 
Model (4) 
Positive Lance 
Armstrong 
Cue: CA Republicans Op-
posed 
-2.51*** 0.61    — — 
 (0.73)    (0.36)    — — 
Cue: American Heart As-
sociation Supported 
— — 0.91** — 
 — — (0.21) — 
Cue: Armstrong Supported — — — 0.82*   
 — — — (0.33)    
Cue: RJ Reynolds Opposed — — — — 
 — — — — 
Cue: Americans for Tax 
Reform Opposed 
— — — — 
 — — — — 
Fact: CA has Excise Tax -0.66    -0.31    -0.55**  -0.59    
 (0.81)    (0.40)    (0.20)    (0.32)    
Conservative -1.45    1.15    -0.53**  -0.96**  
 (0.81)    (1.12)    (0.20)    (0.34)    
Liberal -0.59    0.89*   0.65**  0.71*   
 (0.92)    (0.39)    (0.21)    (0.36)    
Age -0.03    -0.01    -0.02** -0.01    
 (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    
Income 0.35    0.07    0.08    0.11    
 (0.19)    (0.13)    (0.05)    (0.09)    
Education 0.11    0.19    0.26**  0.45**  
 (0.25)    (0.18)    (0.08)    (0.14)    
Tobacco User 0.28    -2.08** -1.29** -1.06** 
 (0.68)    (0.43)    (0.18)    (0.31)    
Political Knowledge -4.98** -0.18    -1.90** -1.90**  
 (1.27)    (0.84)    (0.35)    (0.61)    
Constant 4.63 -0.03    1.18 0.04    
 (1.89)    (0.76)    (0.46)    (0.78)    
Pseudo-R2 .462 .194 .168 .177 
N 115 203 947 349 
Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of 
voting in favor or against California’s Proposition 29 that proposed to 
increase the excise tax on tobacco products sold within the state. Ex-
cluded group: independents who were unaware of any endorsement or 
fact. Coefficients for state-level political knowledge are not reported.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 5 (Continued)—Logit Results for California’s 
Tobacco Excise Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012) 
 Model (5) 
Negative Lance 
Armstrong 
Model (6) 
Negative Tobacco 
Companies 
Model (7) 
Positive Ameri-
cans Tax Re-
form 
Cue: CA Republicans Opposed — — — 
 — — — 
Cue: American Heart Association Support-
ed 
— — — 
 — — — 
Cue: Armstrong Supported -1.40* — — 
 (0.60) — — 
Cue: RJ Reynolds Opposed — 0.34    — 
 — (0.27)    — 
Cue: Americans for Tax Reform Opposed — — -0.84    
 — — (0.56)    
Fact: CA has Excise Tax 0.28 -0.81**  0.50    
 (0.62) (0.27)    (0.75)    
Conservative -0.49 -0.63*   0.15    
 (0.69) (0.29)    (0.64)    
Liberal -1.64* 0.26    2.18** 
 (0.82) (0.27)    (0.66)    
Age -0.00 -0.01    -0.03    
 (0.02) (0.01)    (0.02)    
Income 0.43* 0.05    0.21    
 (0.18) (0.07)    (0.19)    
Education 0.08 0.32*   0.39    
 (0.32) (0.13)    (0.27)    
Tobacco User -1.34* -1.23** -1.56**  
 (0.68) (0.32)    (0.60)    
Political Knowledge -1.69 -0.58    -2.59*   
 (1.11) (0.46)    (1.29)    
Constant 0.94 0.57    0.33    
 (1.75) (0.71)    (1.43)    
Pseudo-R2 .210 .107 .274 
N 88 461 113   
Note: Dependent variable is respondent’s self-reported intention of 
voting in favor or against California’s Proposition 29 that proposed to 
increase the excise tax on tobacco products sold within the state. Ex-
cluded group: independents who were unaware of any endorsement or 
fact. Coefficients for state-level political knowledge are not reported.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Figure 4 
Probability of Voting in Favor of California’s Excise 
Tax Increase (Proposition 29, 2012) 
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decisions and close with a discussion of how our results add to 
our understanding of voter decision-making. 
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tax collected on tobacco products. We evaluated the effective-
ness of ten endorsements in fifteen separate tests of our hy-
potheses. We found support for our hypotheses less than 50% of 
the time, with just seven of the fifteen tests exhibiting signifi-
cant results. When we take into consideration that our re-
spondents’ knowledge of the endorsements was often quite 
poor, it would appear that the effective useful rate of endorse-
ments is even lower than our results imply. 
In addition to our data being the largest collection of indi-
vidual-level research on voters’ decisions on ballot measures, 
the subjects of the initiatives and referendum we covered are 
largely representative of the types of issues that appear on the 
ballots in many states. To date, voters in thirty-five states have 
voted on whether same-sex couples have the right to marry. 
Four of these states have considered the issue more than once 
(Arizona in 2006 and 2008, California in 2000 and 2008, Maine 
in 2009 and 2012, and Nevada in 2000 and 2002). The subject 
of term limits has also been a recurring question on many bal-
lots. In nineteen states, voters have approved limits to the 
number of terms an elected official can serve in the state legis-
lature (four states’ voters have since seen their laws over-
turned). Tobacco taxes are a familiar issue to many voters as 
well. Eleven states have asked voters to approve an increase in 
the amount of excise taxes collected on cigarettes. Four states 
(Arizona, Missouri, Montana, and Oregon) have asked voters to 
increase this tax three times, and California has proposed an 
increase four times.  
If our results imply that some individuals use endorse-
ments only some of the time, is it reasonable to assume that 
most voters are making reasoned choices all of the time? If such 
an assumption is unreasonable, as our data suggest, should the 
government be allowing citizens to vote directly on important 
issues of the day, especially when these votes will often have 
far-reaching and important policy consequences? On a more 
basic level, can direct democracy hope to measure the public’s 
policy preferences at the ballot box? Our results imply that ac-
ademics, policymakers, and jurists should be cautious about the 
average voter’s capacity to decide policy when answering these 
important normative questions.83
 
 83. Taken to their logical conclusion, our results provide a normative ar-
gument supporting the limited implementation of ballot measures as dis-
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For further research, the next task is to explore just how 
individuals are making decisions in lieu of broad use of en-
dorsements. Researchers have thus far avoided this topic in fa-
vor of assuming the existence of the low-information voter who 
is armed with obscure endorsements but lacks simple facts. 
Similar to the jab at the economist who falls into a pit and fails 
to acknowledge the problem because she “assumes the exist-
ence of a ladder to climb out,” political scientists and legal 
scholars have failed to recognize that we assume the routinized 
use of abstruse endorsements to solve the problem of unin-
formed voting in democracy.  
Readers should not interpret our results and analysis as 
claiming that endorsements cannot work. The opposite is true. 
Our results highlight the fact that endorsements are useful to 
many individuals, just not at the rate that many scholars as-
sume. As such, increasing individuals’ usage of endorsements 
when evaluating ballot measures should lead to improved deci-
sion-making and, as a result, policy choices that better reflect 
the majority of the public’s preferences.  
One policy prescription—and one we have argued for in 
previous research—that can increase the usage of cues in initi-
ative and referendum elections is the inclusion of endorsements 
on the ballot. Such a policy change is akin to what already oc-
curs in many candidate elections that display party labels. As 
we note above, party labels convey a substantial amount of in-
formation in a way that is cognitively cheap for voters to pro-
cess and incorporate into their decisions. Affixing relevant en-
dorsements to the ballot for initiatives and referendums can 
have a similar effect for voters in direct democracy.84
 
cussed in ELISABETH R. GERBER, ARTHUR LUPIA, MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS & D. 
RODERICK KIEWIET, STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RE-
SPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY (2001); Valentina A. Bali, Implementing Popu-
lar Initiatives: What Matters for Compliance?, 65 J. POL. 1130 (2003); Elisa-
beth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Does 
Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementa-
tion and Enforcement, 66 J. POL. 43 (2004). 
 
 84. As we note earlier, some endorsements are likely to be more effective 
than others. In our analysis of Proposition 29, “good government” groups such 
as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause were not effective endors-
ers. Political parties and prominent political figures were more persuasive. 
More work is necessary to discern whether this finding extends beyond our 
study, which limits what we can say with regards to what cues will be most 
valuable to voters on the ballot. 
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The information surrounding ballot measures is often quite 
poor, leading many voters to rely on the short title and sum-
mary (which is often a few hundred words, and usually less) 
that appears on the ballot to evaluate the policy in question.85
Empirical evidence suggests that such a policy change 
would be very helpful for voters. Burnett and Kogan run a se-
ries of survey experiments to measure whether elite endorse-
ments reduce the persuasion effects of framed ballot titles and 
summaries.
 
Providing elite endorsements on the ballot is one way to im-
prove the information available to voters when they make their 
choices. Placing endorsements on the ballot could be a potential 
boon for uninformed voters. For informed voters, endorsements 
can remind them who supported and opposed the measure. In 
both cases, endorsements increase the amount of knowledge 
that voters can consider at the time they decide. 
86
  CONCLUSION   
 Their results indicate that the introduction of just 
a single endorsement reduces the potential framing effects in 
half. This research, coupled with the experimental research 
outlined above, strongly suggests that the selection and place-
ment of knowledgeable and trustworthy endorsements on the 
ballot itself will lead voters to make better decisions on policies 
that they often know very little about. 
Using two surveys covering three ballot measures in two 
states, we reconsidered the conventional academic wisdom that 
individuals often use endorsements to inform their decisions in 
direct democracy elections. Our analysis provided only mixed 
support for the conventional wisdom. What our results clearly 
showed is that individuals’ use of endorsements is much more 
limited and highly conditional. Our limited findings stand in 
contrast to the belief that voters routinely use endorsements to 
inform their decisions on complicated ballot measures to over-
come their information deficiencies. Put another way, our re-
sults challenge the widely held assumption that voters are 
competent policymakers who can adeptly use the institutions of 
direct democracy to select policy outcomes they prefer. Future 
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research should further establish when and under what condi-
tions voters use endorsements to inform their decisions. Final-
ly, scholars need to forge a new model of decision-making in di-
rect democracy elections that takes into account voters’ limited 
use of endorsements. 
 
